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CASENOTES
The Warrantless Search Of Closed Containers Under The Automobile Ex-
ception: United States v. Ross`—The decisions of the United States Supreme
Court construing the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution'
delineate a general rule requiring government officials to obtain a valid war-
rant from a neutral and detached magistrate before conducting a search.' This
intermediate judicial approval is intended to lend objectivity to the search and
seizure process, thus safeguarding against unreasonable intrusions. 4 None-
theless, there are some instances in which a valid search may be conducted
without a warrant.' Among these instances are those that fall within the so-
called automobile exception. 6
Although labelled the automobile exception, this rule extends neither to all
searches of automobiles, nor solely to situations where an automobile is in-
volved.' The Supreme Court, however, has seldom been consistent in deciding
what exactly are the appropriate dimensions of the exception's application. 8 All
formulations hold that any warrantless instrusion implicating the fourth
amendment9 which is alleged to be reasonable under the automobile exception
' 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
"[Slearches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357 (1967) (footnotes omitted). This passage has been quoted by the United States Supreme
Court a multitude of times. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1982);
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978).
4 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those
inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged
by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
Id. (footnote omitted).
See, e.g., Chime] v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755, 762-63 (1969) (search incident to
arrest exception); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 297-99 (1967) (hot pursuit exception). The
exceptions to the general rule requiring a warrant have been "jealously and carefully drawn."
Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357 (1967) (exceptions are "specifically established and well-delineated").
See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925); see also Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 462 (1971) (plurality).
7 C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 5 7.01, at 141 (1980). "The exception is
neither limited to automobile searches, nor does it cover all searches of automobiles." Id.
See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality); Cardwell v. Lewis,
417 U.S. 583 (1974) (plurality); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality).
See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
9 The United States Supreme Court uses a two part test formulated by Justice Harlan
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must nonetheless be based on probable cause. 1 ° Along with this requirement of
probable cause, the Supreme Court has recognized two factors which justify
the use of the automobile exception. These factors have recently been identified
by the Court as "inherent mobility" and a "diminished expectation of pri-
vacy." 1 ' Disagreement among the Justices over the application of the
automobile exception has focused mainly on the roles of these two justifying
factors."
The mobility of automobiles has been an underlying justification for the
exception from its beginning.' 3 The Court has recognized that when police are
confronted with a vehicle which could drive away, it is impractical to require
them to obtain a warrant before searching or seizing the car. 14
 The second
justification, the idea of a reduced expectation of privacy, was not enunciated
by the Court, however, until later in the history of the automobile exception.' 5
The Court has indicated that even when the mobility of an automobile is not
imminent, a warrantless search or seizure may still be permissible because of
the low level of privacy people usually associate with their cars. 16
 Based on
these considerations of mobility and a reduced expectation of privacy, the
Court has had little difficulty using the automobile exception to justify the war-
rantless search of a vehicle stopped by police on the public highway." The
Court, however, has found the application of the automobile exception to be
more difficult in other situations; for instance when police search or seize a
parked vehicle without a warrant." In these more complex situations, neither
the mobility of the car nor any reduced expectation of privacy lead to a clear
result.
Difficulties are especially likely to occur where police make a warrantless
search of a closed container found within a motor vehicle.' 9 Although the
in his concurring opinion in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967), to determine
whether the fourth amendment is implicated. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 & n.12
(1978), An intrusion by a government official is a "search" or a "seizure" governed by the
fourth amendment if the individual intruded upon had a subjective expectation of privacy from
such an intrusion, and that expectation was reasonable judged by societal standards. Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
1 ° See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 161-62 (1925).
" United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977).
" See, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (plurality) (compare opinion of
Blackmun, J., at 585-96, with opinion of Stewart, J., dissenting, at 596-99); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality) (compare opinion of Stewart, J., at 447,
458-64, with opinions of Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting, at 504-05, and White, J.,
concurring and dissenting, at 523-27).
" See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
" Id.; see Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 765 n.14 (1979).
" See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977); Cardwell v, Lewis, 417
U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality).
" See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality); Cady v. Dombrowski,
413 U.S. 433, 441-43 (1973).
" See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 760-61 (1979).
111 See cases cited supra note 12.
19
 This difficulty is demonstrated by the fact that the Supreme Court itself has ad-
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motor vehicle may present conditions which can justify the invocation of the
automobile exception, it is apparent that such conditions do not extend to the
closed container." A majority of the Supreme Court has recognized that with
closed containers, as opposed to motor vehicles, neither the possibility of
mobility nor any reduced expectation of privacy exists to the requisite degree. 21
In deciding this issue, the Court initially focused on the attributes of the con-
tainer, and indicated that since "inherent mobility" and a "diminished expec-
tation of privacy" were absent, a closed container, once seized by police, could
not be searched without a warrant under the automobile exception. 22 This was
true regardless of whether or not the container was seized from an auto-
mobile. 23
In United States r. Ross, 24
 however, a majority of the Supreme Court re-
jected the notion that closed containers found within a motor vehicle could
never be searched without a warrant under the automobile exception. 25 The
Ross Court held that once a motor vehicle is legitimately subject to a war-
rantless search under the automobile exception, the scope of that search is as
broad as a magistrate could authorize through a warrant." The significance of
this conclusion is that once there is both probable cause to search a motor vehi-
cle, and some combination of the vehicle's "inherent mobility" and "dimin-
ished expectation of privacy" sufficient to allow the initiation of a warrantless
search under the automobile exception, the extent of the warrantless search
permissible is defined only by the searching official's determination of probable
cause. 27
 The searching official may therefore make an immediate warrantless
search not only of the motor vehicle and its integral parts, 28 but also of any
closed container within the vehicle which could possibly conceal the object of
the search." The Ross Court expanded the scope of such warrantless searches
in this manner despite the fact that the "inherent mobility" and the
dressed issues concerning the automobile exception which are presented by that particular fact
situation on four occasions in the space of five years. See United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157,
2159, 2161-72 (1982); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 424-29 (1981) (plurality); Arkansas
v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762-65 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1977).
This fact situation has also recently been before the Court in the context of the search incident to
arrest exception. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-63 (1981),
" United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977); see Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 461 n.18 (1971) (plurality).
21
 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763-65 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977).
22 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977).
" See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 428 (1981) (plurality); Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n.13 (1979).
" 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
" See id. at 2167, 2172.
" Id. at 2159.
" See id. at 2170-72; see also Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763-65 (1979); United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977).
28 See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763 (1979).
29 See 102 S. Ct. at 2172.
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"diminished expectation of privacy" of the motor vehicle and its integral parts
do not extend to closed containers found within the vehicle, and therefore can-
not justify allowing a warrantless search of such containers under the
automobile exception."
This casenote will begin by examining the history and development of the
automobile exception, including the Supreme Court's previous treatment of
closed containers under that exception. Next, the Ross Court's reasoning will
be discussed. The Ross decision will then be analyzed and criticized under a
view of the fourth amendment which adopts a warrant standard of rea-
sonableness. This analysis will show that by equating the scope of a warrantless
search with a search authorized by a neutral and detached magistrate, the Ross
decision undermines a cardinal principle of the currently accepted view of the
fourth amendment; that a neutral and detached magistrate's determination of
probable cause is superior to that of the searching official in the protection of
individual rights secured by the fourth amendment. Further, it will be shown
that the Ross decision fails to appreciate that this superior protection provided
by a warrant makes it imperative to limit the scope as well as the initiation of
warrantless searches under the automobile exception to the circumstances
which justify having such an exception. The Ross Court's attempt to justify the
failure to maintain such a dual limitation on warrantless searches under the
automobile exception based on "practical considerations" will be criticized for
failing to sufficiently account for the countervailing fourth amendment values
which are sacrificed. A revision of the automobile exception will then be sug-
gested. This revision would respect the benefits provided by pre-search judicial
warrants by reflecting the idea that search warrants should be used whenever
reasonably practicable. The revision would entail dropping the "expectation of
privacy" factor from the automobile exception analysis, and allowing war-
rantless searches under the automobile exception only when, due to problems
related to mobility, a warrant requirement would unreasonably burden law en-
forcement. In summary, this casenote submits that the scope of the warrantless
search permissible under the automobile exception which is enunciated in Ross
is overbroad in light of currently accepted fourth amendment principles which
are reflected by a warrant standard of reasonableness.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION
A. The Justifications for the Exception
The doctrine known as the automobile exception was first enunciated by
the Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States.'" In Carroll, federal prohibition
agents had knowledge indicating that the defendants were bootleggers who
30 See id.; Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763-65 (1979); United States v. Chad-
wick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977).
3 ' 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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transported liquor to a particular town." On this occasion, the agents unex-
pectedly encountered the defendants driving to that town, and stopped the
defendant's vehicle." This stop was followed by a search of the car, 34 which
uncovered the suspected contraband." No warrant was ever obtained."
The Supreme Court upheld the warrantless search in Carroll as valid
under the fourth amendment." This validity hinged on two factors which the
Court found to be presented by the circumstances of the case before it. First,
the Court noted that the mobility of automobiles and other modes of transpor-
tation set them apart in fourth amendment terms." This mobility, in the
Court's view, created an exigency because a vehicle could easily leave the area
while a warrant was being obtained." The Court therefore determined the
situation required an immediate warrantless search.° Second, the Court held
that such warrantless searches could be valid only when based on probable
cause, which existed in Carroll. 41
In Chambers v. Maroney 42
 the Court invoked the automobile exception to
uphold a warrantless search of a vehicle made after the car had been taken from
the scene of an arrest to the police station, thereby expanding the boundaries of
the Carroll exception. 43 Faced with the apparent lack of mobility of the vehicle
at the time and place of the search," the Court nevertheless restated Carroll's
dual requirement of probable cause plus exigent circumstances arising from the
car's mobility.'" The Chambers Court noted that the Carroll justifications clearly
" Id. at 160.
" Id. at 136.
" Id. One federal agent raised the rumble seat, looked under the seat cushion, and
"struck" at the lazyback 9f the seat, Id. at 174. The officer found the lazyback to be "a great deal
harder" than is usual. Id.
" Id. at 136. Sixty-eight bottles of whiskey and gin were confiscated from behind the
upholstery of the defendant's vehicle. Id.
98 Id. at 174.
37 Id. at 149, 155.56, 160-62.
88 Id. at 153. The Court discussed several statutes in conjunction with the fourth
amendment which supported the idea of the necessity of a warrantless search due to the mobility
of the place to be searched. Id. at 143-53.
39 Id. at 153.
4° Id. at 153, 160-62.
4 ' Id. at 155-56, 160-62. The Court stated that to allow the search of vehicles for contra-
band based on less than probable cause would be "untolerable and unreasonable." Id. at 153-54.
" 399 U.S. 42 (1970). Between Carroll and Chambers the Court applied the automobile
exception several times without any major modification of the reasoning set forth in Carroll. See,
e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 165-71 (1949); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S.
253, 254-55 (1938); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 701 (1931).
43
 399 U.S. at 43-44, 48-52. Defendants, suspected of armed robbery, were stopped
and arrested by police based on a description of the robbers and their vehicle given by the victim
and witnesses who observed the car drive away from the location of the robbery. It at 44. After
the arrest, police drove the car to the police station, and during a thorough search there found
two revolvers, ammunition, and other evidence associated with this and a separate robbery. Id.
44 See id. at 44; see also id. at 65 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The car's occupants were under arrest and the vehicle was under police control at the station
house. Id. at 44; see id. at 65 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
45 Id. at 51.
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would have authorized a warrantless search at the place where the vehicle was
stopped by the police," and held that bringing the car back to the police station
did not abridge the applicability of the automobile exception. 47
One year after Chambers was decided, the Court determined in the plural-
ity decision of Coolidge v. New Hampshire" that a search made of a vehicle which
was seized while parked at its owner's residence by police at the police station
without a valid warrant 49 could not be justified under the automobile excep-
tion." The plurality explained that unlike the vehicle in Chambers, the
automobile in Coolidge had not presented any threat of mobility to the police,
either at the time the car was first seized," or at the time of any of the searches
of the car." The Coolidge plurality stated that an imminent threat of mobility
must exist at some time prior to the warrantless search for the doctrine of Car-
roll and Chambers to apply." The plurality noted that the mere fact that an
automobile was involved was not enough to invoke the automobile exception."
The Court indicated that where the accepted justifying circumstances were ab-
sent, a warrantless search could not be upheld under the automobile
exception."
Several years after Coolidge, the Court produced another plurality decision
on the automobile exception, Cardwell v. Lewis. 56 In Cardwell the warrantless
4 ' Id. at 52.
47 Id. In Chambers the Court stated specific reasons why it would have been impractical
for the police to perform the search of the car at the spot where they stopped it. Id. at 52 n.10.
Subsequent cases make clear, however, that the validity of a vehicle search at the police station is
not contingent upon circumstances which make an on the scene search impractical. See, e.g.,
Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 67-69 (1975) (per curiam) (warrantless search of a car at the station
upheld even though police easily could have conducted the search when the car was first
stopped); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 3 (1980) (Court reaffirmed the holding of White).
The current position of the Court is that if a warrantless search was permissible at the scene of the
stop, it is always practical to allow such a search a short time later at the station. White, 423 U.S.
at 68; Bannister, 449 U.S. at 3.
48 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality).
49 A warrant was obtained before the car was seized; however, this warrant was deter-
mined to be invalid. Id. at 447, 449. Thus, it was necessary to justify the search on other grounds.
Id. at 453.
5° Id, at 447, 462. The defendant was arrested at his house for allegedly murdering a
14-year-old girl. Id. at 447. His car was parked at his residence at the time of the arrest and re-
mained there until it was towed to the police station two hours later to be searched for "certain
objects and things used in the commission of said offense, now kept, and concealed in or upon"
the vehicle. Id. at 447-48 (quoting from the invalid search warrant).
Id. at 463 n.20.
" Id. at 448, 463-64. The car was searched by the police two days after it was towed to
the police station, and on two other occasions eleven and fourteen months later. Id. The car re-
mained under police control at all times, thus in a non-mobile state. Id. at 463-64.
" Unlike Chambers, the threat of mobility was never present in Coolidge. Id. at 462, 463
n.20.
54 Id. at 461-62. The word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the
Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears." Id.
55 Id. at 462.
" 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (plurality).
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search by police, at the police station, of a vehicle which had been seized while
parked in a public parking lot° was upheld under the automobile exception."
The vehicle was unoccupied, 59 but in the plurality's view it could have been
driven away if it were not seized by the police. 5° Consequently, the plurality
found an exigent circumstance and held that under Chambers a warrant was not
required to seize and search the car." In addition, the plurality sought to
justify the use of the automobile exception by reference to the lesser expectation
of privacy associated with cars." This lesser expectation of privacy was derived
by the plurality both from the fact that the contents of an automobile are often
in "plain view,"" and because the intrusion itself in Cardwell was seen as
minimal by the Court." A majority of the Supreme Court subsequently has ac-
cepted the reduced expectation of privacy justification as a legitimate compo-
nent of the automobile exception analysis." The automobile exception, there-
fore, will allow the warrantless search of a motor vehicle when the government
official has probable cause to make the search, and the circumstances of mobili-
ty and a reduced expectation of privacy justify dispensing with the generally re-
quired search warrant from a neutral magistrate."
B. The Exception and Closed Containers
Many of the recent cases involving the application of the automobile ex-
ception have involved the propriety of the warrantless search of closed con-
tainers found within motor vehicles. 67 The Supreme Court has addressed this
question on several different occasions in the space of only a few years." To
answer this question the Court has had to consider when, if ever, the rationale
behind the automobile exception, used to justify the warrantless search of a
" See id. at 587-88, 592-93.
58 See id. at 592-96.
59 Id. at 587-88.
60 See id. at 594-95.
61 Id. at 593-96.
62 Id. at 590-91.
" Id. at 590; Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 442 (1972). The Court has also of-
fered the fact that motor vehicles are extensively regulated by state and local authorities to sup-
port the idea that there is a reduced expectation of privacy associated with automobiles. United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977); see Cady, 413 U.S. at 441.
64 See 417 U.S. at 588-89, 593 n.9. The Cardwell plurality distinguished Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality) on this point. 417 U.S. at 593 n.9. The Cardwell
plurality stressed the fact that the police only examined the exterior of a car which had been seized,
as opposed to the thorough search of an entire car which had been seized in Coolidge. See id. at 588 &
n.4, 589, 592 n.8, 593 & n.9 (emphasis added).
" United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977).
66 See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
67 See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 426 (1981) (plurality) (listing of cases).
68 See United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2168-72 (1982); Robbins v. California,
453 U.S. 420, 422-23, 425-29 (1981) (plurality); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762-65
(1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 11-12 (1977).
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motor vehicle, can also justify the warrantless search of a closed container
found within a motor vehicle.
In United States v. Chadwick69 a majority of the Court explicitly recognized
basic differences between closed containers and motor vehicles which were rele-
vant to the respective applicability of the rationale behind the automobile ex-
ception. 7 ° In Chadwick, government agents seized a footlocker which they
believed contained contraband" from the trunk of an automobile and searched
the closed container without a warrant." The automobile, however, was
parked and the footlocker had only just been placed in its open trunk at the
time of the seizure." The warrantless search itself took place an hour and a half
later in a government building."
The government argued that regardless of the coincidental involvement of
the automobile in the seizure and search of the footlocker, the same considera-
tions which have justified warrantless vehicle searches in the past should also
justify the warrantless search of the movable closed container in Chadwick."
The Chadwick Court rejected this contention, finding that the container in-
volved, while movable, was not mobile in the same sense as an automobile
because the container was easily seized and secured by the police." The Chad-
wick Court also found that the container, unlike an automobile, displayed a
high expectation of privacy. 77 The circumstances of mobility and a reduced ex-
pectation of privacy both being absent, the Court determined that a war-
rantless search of the footlocker could not be justified under the automobile ex-
ception. 78
In Arkansas v. Sanders" the Court faced a situation somewhat similar to
Chadwick." Government officials observed a suitcase which they had probable
cause to believe contained contraband being placed in the trunk of a taxi cab. 8 '
Unlike Chadwick, however, the vehicle in Sanders drove away with the container
still in its trunk." The officials followed the taxi, stopped it, seized the suitcase
and searched it on the spot without a warrant." The government argued that
because there was probable cause to search the suitcase, and because the suit-
case was seized from a motor vehicle which had been stopped on the public
69
 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
70 Id. at 13.
71 The Court noted that the First Circuit had held that the agents had probable cause to
believe that the footlocker contained contraband. Id, at 5.
72 Id. at 3-4.
73 Id. at 4.
'4 Id.
" Id. at 11-12.
76 Id. at 13.
77 Id.
78 See id.
79
 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
80 Id. at 762 n.9.
81 Id. at 755, 761.
" Id. at 755, 762-63.
" Id. at 755-56.
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highway, the warrantless search of the suitcase was valid under the automobile
exception." The Court rejected the government's contention, concluding that
despite the factual variation, the reasoning of Chadwick controlled." The
Sanders Court recognized that although the suitcase was seized from an
automobile stopped on the public highway, it was the same as the closed con-
tainer searched in Chadwick in that it was still easily seized and secured" and it
still displayed a high expectation of privacy." The Court saw no reason why
the characteristics of a closed container seized from a car would be any different
from a closed container seized from any other place." Consequently, the Court
stated that the fact that a container was seized from an automobile in no way
controlled the degree of fourth amendment protection accorded that
container." Because the justifying circumstances of mobility and a reduced ex-
pectation of privacy were not presented by the suitcase itself, the Court deter-
mined that the automobile exception could not excuse the failure of the search-
ing official to obtain a warrant from a neutral magistrate before opening that
closed container. 90
The inquiry into the propriety of the warrantless search of closed con-
tainers found within automobiles, however, did not end with the Sanders deci-
sion. Robbins v. California91 involved a situation where a police officer had
stopped a car on the public highway because of the operator's erratic driving. 92
At the scene of the stop, the officer discovered evidence indicating that the vehi-
cle contained marijuana. 93 The officer conducted a search of the car and
discovered two bundles wrapped in green, opaque plastic." The officer opened
the packages without first obtaining a search warrant." The government
asserted that the warrantless search of the opaque packages undertaken by the
officer in Robbins was justified under the fourth amendment." The government
relied on language from the Sanders decision which indicated that not all con-
tainers discovered by police would be protected under the fourth amendment
2* Id. at 761-62.
" Id. at 763-65.
" See id. at 763.
" Id. at 764.
" Id. at 763-64. In general a warrant is required to search a closed container, even
when it is lawfully seized by a government official without a warrant. See, e.g., United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878); see also United
States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 253 (1970). But cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218, 223, 236 (1973).
29 442 U.S. at 765 n.13. "[T]he extent to which the Fourth Amendment applies to con-
tainers and other parcels depends not at all upon whether they are seized from an automobile."
Id.
9° Id. at 763-65.
91 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality).
92 Id. at 422.
93 Id.
94 Id.
" See id. at 422-23.
" See id. at 425.
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through the requirement of a search warrant. 97 The government argued that
the containers in Robbins, unlike the luggage type containers in Sanders and
Chadwick, displayed a reduced expectation of privacy and thus were properly
subject to a warrantless search."
In a plurality opinion, the Court stated that a warrantless search of the
vehicle itself was justified under the automobile exception." The Robbins Court
nonetheless rejected the idea that the warrantless search of the green plastic
bundles was within the proper scope of a warrantless search permissible under
the automobile exception.'°° A majority of the Justices concluded that it was
improper to open the bundles before a search warrant was obtained from a
neutral and detached magistrate."'
The plurality opinion based its conclusion on the reasoning expressed in
Chadwick and Sanders.'" The plurality refused to distinguish the containers
searched in Robbins from "luggage type" containers holding that all closed,
opaque containers exhibited a sufficiently high expectation of privacy so that
they were outside the purview of a warrantless search under the automobile ex-
ception.' 03 The plurality repeated the conclusion of Sanders that a closed con-
tainer in an automobile is no different from a closed container in any other
place.'" After reviewing the circumstances which can justify allowing a war-
rantless search under the automobile exception, 105 the Court held that a closed,
opaque container could not be searched without a warrant, even when found
during the course of a lawful warrantless search of an automobile.'"
Only four members of the Robbins Court, however, expressly subscribed to
the above reasoning. 107 Justice Stevens, in dissent,'" found Robbins to turn on
an issue entirely different from that presented to the Court in Chadwick and
Sanders.'" The Justice noted that in Robbins the entire car, including the
packages found within it, was the focus of the search,"° while in Chadwick and
Sanders the searching officials were concerned solely with the individual closed
" Id. at 427.
" See id. at 424-26.
99 See id. at 428.
'°° See id.
'°' Id. at 428-29. Justice Powell concurred with the judgment but not the reasoning of
the plurality. Id. at 429. The alternative to an immediate search is to hold the closed container
until a warrant can be obtained. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762 (1979).
102 453 U.S. at 425.
1 °3 Id. at 426-28.
194 Id. at 425.
105 Id. at 424-27. The Court specifically referred to its past discussions of "inherent
mobility" and "a diminished expectation of privacy" from United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
1, 12-13 (1977), and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763-65 (1979). 453 U.S. at 424-27.
106 453 U.S. at 428-29.
107 Id. at 422.
'°0 Id. at 444.
109 Id. at 444-47, 445 n.3.
See id. at 444.
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container involved."' Using Justice Stevens's distinction as a springboard, a
majority of the Court overruled the Robbins decision in United States v. Ross, 12
only one year after Robbins had been decided.
C. The Ross Decision
In late November, 1978 a car owned and operated by Albert Ross was
stopped by District of Columbia police on the suspicion that he was selling nar-
cotics which were stored in the trunk of the vehicle."' The police searched the
car and discovered a closed paper bag in the trunk ." 4 They opened the bag and
found glassine bags of white powder, later identified as heroin. 15 The vehicle
was then brought to the police station where, after a more thorough examina-
tion of the car, a zippered leather pouch, also in the trunk, was discovered. "6
The police opened the pouch and found $3,200 in cash.'" No warrant was ever
obtained."
Prior to trial, defendant Ross moved to suppress the heroin found in the
paper bag and the money found in the leather pouch. 119 The Federal District
Court for the District of Columbia denied this motion.' 20 The contested evi-
dence was admitted at trial, and Ross was subsequently convicted."'
A three-judge panel of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia reversed the conviction. 122
 The court of appeals said that the war-
rantless search of the vehicle itself was valid under the automobile exception. 123
The court also upheld the warrantless search of the paper bag. 124 The court
based its reversal on the failure of the police to obtain a warrant prior to open-
ing the zippered leather pouch.' 25
 The distinction between the validity of the
"' See id. at 445 & n.3.
12 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
13 Id. at 2160. The suspicion of Ross was based on a tip from an informant with a
reputation for reliability who told District of Columbia police that someone named "Bandit" was
dispensing narcotics from the trunk of a "purplish-maroon" vehicle at a specified location, and
that additional narcotics were in the trunk. Id. Upon arrival at that location police spotted a
maroon Chevrolet, registered to Albert Ross. Id. A check on Ross revealed that he matched the
description of "Bandit" as given by the informant, and was known to use the alias "Bandit." Id.
After a period of observation the police stopped the vehicle, which was operated by a person
matching Ross' ("Bandit's") description. Id.
1 " Id. Police first searched the interior of the car, finding a bullet on the front seat and a
pistol in the glove compartment. Id.
1 " Id.
" 6 Id.
117 Id .
"B Id,
"9
 Id.
120
121 Id.
122 Id. at 2160.
123 Id.
' 24 Id.
126 Id. at 2160-61.
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two warrantless searches was based upon what the court of appeals perceived
as a reasonable expectation of privacy in the leather pouch as opposed to no
reasonable privacy expectation associated with a rolled up paper bag. '26
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia then decided to
rehear the case en banc. 127 A majority of the court found the warrantless search
of both containers to be unlawful, 128 expressing dissatisfaction with any distinc-
tion based on varied expectations of privacy between the two closed
containers.'" The court stated that both the closed paper bag and the leather
pouch displayed a sufficient intent on the part of the defendant Ross to keep
their contents private.'" The court therefore concluded that absent some ex-
igency presented by the containers seized from the automobile, the police could
not search them without first obtaining a warrant from a neutral and detached
magistrate .' 31
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that both closed containers could
properly be searched under the fourth amendment without a warrant.'" The
Court stated that the determinative issue was whether the scope of a lawful
warrantless vehicle search included the right to search closed containers found
within that vehicle.' 33 The Ross majority noted that a recent pronouncement of
the Court, Robbins v. California, ' 34 had been unable to provide an answer to this
question supported by a majority opinion.'" The Ross Court held that the
scope of a warrantless vehicle search permissible under the automobile excep-
tion is as broad as a magistrate could authorize through a warrant.'" The
Court therefore concluded that warrantless search could extend to anywhere
inside the vehicle where the searching official determines there is probable
cause to search, including within closed containers.'"
In so holding, the Ross majority distinguished two earlier pronouncements
of the Court where the opening of a closed container seized from a car without
a search warrant was held to violate the fourth amendment; United States v.
'" Id. at 2160. The three judge panel of the court of appeals apparently read Arkansas
v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n.13 (1979), to indicate that certain "less worthy" containers
could be searched without a warrant when legitimately seized by the police. United States v.
Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1161 & n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en bane). Subsequent decisions of the
Supreme Court reject any distinction between "worthy" and "unworthy" containers. United
States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2171; see California v. Robbins, 453 U.S. at 425-27.
127 102 S. Ct. at 2161.
128 United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en bane).
129 Id. at 1161, 1170-71.
130
 Id. at 1171.
" 1 Id.
132 102 S. Ct. at 2159, 2170-73.
"' Id. at 2168.
134 453 U.S 420 (1981) (plurality).
136 See 102 S. Ct. at 2167-68, 2172. The Ross Court noted, however, that the parties in
Robbins did not squarely address the issue, even though it was presented by the facts of that case.
Id. at 2168; see Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. at 435 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
136 102 S. Ct. at 2159.
167 Id. at 2172.
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Chadwicki 38 and Arkansas v. Sanders. 139 The Court noted that in both Chadwick
and Sanders probable cause to search had been directed solely at the closed con-
tainer involved and not at the automobile from which the container had been
taken."° A key element of the automobile exception, probable cause to search a
motor vehicle,' 4 ' was therefore missing in those cases. The Ross Court stated
that it is only in cases like Ross and Robbins, where there is probable cause to
search a motor vehicle and the vehicle's "inherent mobility" and "diminished
expectation of privacy" justify the initiation of a warrantless search, that the
proper scope of such a warrantless search can be determined."'
The Court then turned to the justifications for its holding that the proper
scope of a warrantless search initiated under the automobile exception included
the opening of closed containers found during that search."' The Court began
by referring to some past warrantless vehicle searches upheld by the Court
under the automobile exception.'" The Court noted the thorough nature of
those past lawful warrantless searches, and stated that the scope of a search
which had been held to include the right to rip open the upholstery in a car
would logically also include the right to open a closed container found
underneath that upholstery. " 5 The Court also indicated that some of the past
warrantless vehicle searches it had upheld under the automobile exception had
actually included the opening of closed containers found within the vehicle.'"
The Ross majority qualified this latter point by noting that the validity of those
container searches had not been contested by the parties in those cases.' 47 The
Court stated, however, that the fact that those container searches were not even
contested demonstrated the legal profession's clear understanding that the
automobile exception included the right to search closed containers during the
course of a lawful warrantless vehicle search.'"
The Ross Court next discussed an argument premised upon what it termed
"practical considerations."' 49 The Court noted that illicit materials carried
within motor vehicles will almost always be concealed, usually within closed
containers.'" Consequently, the Court stated, unless the permissible scope of
the automobile exception included the right to search such closed containers,
'" 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
139
 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
10
 102 S. Ct. at 2165-67.
14 ' See supra notes 10 and 41 and accompanying text.
'" 102 S. Ct. at 2167-68.
14' Id. at 2168-69.
144 Id. at 2169 (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) and Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)).
"5
 102 S. Ct. at 2169.
146 •.a (citing Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938) and Husty v. United States,
282 U.S. 694 (1931)).
147
 102 S. Ct. at 2169.
' 4° Id. at 2169-70.
149 Id. at 2170-71 & n.28.
"°
	 at 2170.
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the "practical consequences" of the automobile exception would be largely
nullified." 151
In support of its decision the Ross Court also drew an analogy to situations
where searches were conducted under the authorization of a valid warrant. 15 2
The Court noted that a search of a vehicle made with a judicial warrant would
include the opening of any compartments or containers where there was prob-
able cause to believe the object of the search might be located.'" The Court
stated that when any lawful search, with its.purpose and limits exactly defined,
is under way, "nice distinctions" such as that between a vehicle and closed
containers within that vehicle must yield to the "prompt and efficient" com-
pletion of the search.'" The Court held that the scope of a warrantless search
initiated under the automobile exception is the same as could be approved by a
magistrate through a warrant, and thus includes the opening of closed con-
tainers.'" The Court noted that its reasoning applied equally to all closed con-
tainers. 156
Finally, the Ross Court asserted that "[olf greatest importance" their
decision was consistent with the Court's past decisions interpreting the fourth
amendment. 157
 The Court recited an often quoted passage from its decision in
Katz v. United States'" strongly declaring the requirement of a warrant before a
search may be conducted, subject only to a few narrow exceptions,'" The Ross
Court stated that the rule which it pronounced was consistent with a "well-
delineated" automobile exception.' 6°
Justice Marshall, in dissent,' 61 expressed concern that the Ross majority
was moving towards establishing a "probable cause" exception to the warrant
clause of the fourth amendment. 162 Justice Marshall noted that such a position
was foreclosed by the Court's own prior decisions.'" He observed that the
result of defining the scope of a warrantless search by the extent of probable
' 31 Id. The Court indicated that these "practical considerations" were an important fac-
tor to be considered in defining the scope of the automobile exception. See id. at 2163 n.9, 2171
n.28.
152 Id. at 2170-71.
133 Id. at 2170.
134 Id. at 2170-71.
i" Id. at 2170-72.
' 36 Id. at 2171.
157 Id. at 2172.
158 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
159 102 S. Ct. at 2172.
160 See id.
"' Id. at 2173. Several other Justices also filed opinions. Id. In brief concurrences,
Justices Blackmun and Powell emphasized the need for clarification in this confused area of the
law. Id. Both joined the opinion of the Court written by Justice Stevens which they felt expressed
a much-needed clear rule of law concerning the automobile exception. Id_ Justice White, in dis-
sent, merely noted that he would have maintained the reasoning of Robbins v. California, 453
U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality), and that he agreed substantially with Justice Marshall's dissent. Id.
162 Id. at 2174 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
163 Id. at 2176.
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cause alone is to equate the searching official with the normally required
neutral and detached magistrate.'" Justice Marshall noted that the two are not
normally considered equals for purposes of the fourth amendment. 165
Justice Marshall indicated that historically the automobile exception has
been limited by the factors of mobility and a reduced expectation of privacy. 166
He noted that the majority failed to base its decision on these justifications.' 67
He added that this failure was not surprising since those justifications did not
support extending the automobile exception to include the warrantless search
of closed containers found within an automobile.'"
Justice Marshall rejected the majority's interpretations of past Court deci-
sions concerning the automobile exception. 169 He stated that the thorough
searches upheld by the Court in the past which were cited by the majority all
involved integral and inseparable parts of the vehicle, and thus were subject to
the same mobility problems as the vehicle itself."° As for decisions not even ad-
dressing the issue explicitly, he found them to be questionable authority upon
which to base the warrantless search of a closed container."' Justice Marshall
also found the "practical considerations" voiced by the majority to be unper-
suasive and thus rejected the idea of basing such an extension of the automobile
exception on such considerations. 12
Finally, the Justice indicated that the majority's rule would create
anomalous results."' He questioned the majority's distinction between con-
tainers found during a probable cause search of an entire car and containers
found in other contexts. 174 Justice Marshall concluded by stating that the only
plausible explanation for the majority's rule was expediency, which he deemed
to be an illegitimate basis for altering fourth amendment doctrine. 15
II. Ross AND THE WARRANT STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS
The declaration of the Court in United States v. Ross, that the scope of a
warrantless search validly initiated under the automobile exception is the same
as that which a neutral and detached magistrate could authorize through a war-
rant,' 7
€ effectively means that the boundaries of such a warrantless search will
164 Id. at 2177.
163 Id. at 2174-75. Justice Marshall expressed concern over the potential for overbroad
searches justified by hindsight reasoning and a general disrepeci for orderly law enforcement
which would be created by the majority's new rule. See id.
166 Id. at 2175-76.
1 " Id. at 2176.
'" Id.
"g Id. at 2178.
' 7° Id. at 2179.
171 See id. at 2178 n.7.
172 See id, at 2179-80.
173 Id. at 2180.
174 Id.
173 Id. at 2181.
176
 Id. at 2159, 2172.
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be established by the searching official's determination of probable cause.'"
This determination will not be limited by the circumstances which are nec-
essary to justify the initiation of that warrantless search.'" By equating the
scope of a warrantless search under the automobile exception with a search
authorized by a neutral and detached magistrate, the Ross decision undermines
a cardinal principle of the currently accepted view of the fourth amendment
that a neutral and detached magistrate's determination of probable cause is
superior to that of the searching official in the protection of individual rights
secured by the fourth amendment.'" The Ross decision fails to appreciate that
this superior fourth amendment protection provided by a warrant makes it im-
perative to limit the scope as well as the initiation of warrantless searches to cir-
cumstances which can justify relying on the searching official's determination
of probable cause rather than that of the neutral magistrate.'" Finally, the Ross
Court's attempt to justify the failure to maintain such a dual limitation on war-
rantless searches under the automobile exception based on "practical con-
siderations" does not sufficiently account for the countervailing fourth amend-
ment values which will be sacrificed through the implementation of the Ross
Court's reasoning in the future. 1 e'
A. The "Superiority" of the Neutral and Detached Magistrate
In Ross the Court concluded that the scope of the valid warrantless vehicle
search under the automobile exception included the opening of two closed con-
tainers.'" The Court reached this conclusion despite its own previous
acknowledgment that a closed container does not present either "inherent
mobility" or a "diminished expectation of privacy; '" 83 the two factors nec-
essary to justify the initiation of a warrantless seach under the automobile ex-
ception.'" Rather than limiting the extent of the warrantless search permissi-
ble under the automobile exception with those justifying factors, the Ross Court
indicated that the scope of the warrantless search would be the same as a
magistrate could authorize through a warrant.'" The Ross Court thereby con-
tradicted the fourth amendment principle that a neutral magistrate's deter-
mination of probable cause is superior to that of the searching official.'"
In carrying out his law enforcement function, a government official who is
considering whether or not it is reasonable to undertake a search 187 necessarily
'" Id. at 2172.
"a See id. at 2170-72.
1 " See infra notes 182-204 and accompanying text.
'I'D See infra notes 203-21 and accompanying text.
'" See infra notes 227-48 and accompanying text.
III See 102 S. Ct. 2160, 2172-73.
18' See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763-65 (1979).
114 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
'" See 102 S. Ct. at 2159, 2172.
186 See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
187 Generally, before a search can be "reasonable" as required by the fourth amend-
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occupies a biased position. Because that official is involved so closely in the dif-
ficult task of criminal investigation, he is less likely to make an accurate assess-
ment of whether there is probable cause to conduct the search.'" In contrast,
a neutral and detached magistrate's determination of when probable cause to
conduct a search exists is more likely to be reliable since he is removed from the
pressures of police work and is capable of making an objective judgment.'"
Judicial weighing of the probable cause factor alternatively could be required
after, instead of before, the search, but then it is too late to prevent an
unreasonable intrusion.'" Also, post hoc rationalization would make it more
likely that a search would later be found to have been reasonable if evidence or
contraband was in fact discovered, since that discovery would color what may
have been an unrevealing set of facts prior to the search. 19 ' These principles
thus support the idea of obtaining prior judicial determination of probable
cause. 192
The superiority of the neutral magistrate's determination of probable
cause is recognized in fourth amendment doctrine through the warrant stand-
ard of reasonableness. This standard, as is implied by its name, requires that a
warranti" must be obtained from a neutral magistrate before a search may be
"reasonable" as required by the fourth amendment.'" The Supreme Court
meat there must be probable cause to conduct a search. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51
(1970), In the area of criminal investigation, probable cause I() search exists where "the facts and
circumstances within [the] knowledge Iof the officials who want to make the search] and of which
they had reasonably trustworthy information land sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that" certain items related to criminal activity will be found in a particular
location. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925); see also United States v. Harris, 403
U.S. 573, 574-85 (1971) (plurality); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 411-420 (1969);
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109-16 (1964). While this form of probable cause is not constitu-
tionally required in support of all searches, see, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24, 30 (1968)
("stop and frisk" allowed based on reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot); Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538-39 (1967) (administrative, as opposed to criminal, prob-
able cause); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 767 (1969) (no probable cause needed for search
made incident to a valid arrest), this casenote is directed at an area of the fourth amendment
where probable cause in the criminal context, as described above, is required. See United States
v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2164 n.11.
188 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-50 (1971) (plurality).
' 89 See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 758-59; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10, 13-14 (1948). "Unreasonable assertions of the executive authority" will be avoided through a
separation of governmental powers. See Sanders, 442 U.S. at 759; United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1972).
19° See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484, 486 (1976); United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1972).
' 9 ' See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964).
' 92
 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1977); United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314-18 (1972).
193
 A warrant, to be valid under the fourth amendment, must be based on the
magistrate's belief that the search to be undertaken is supported by probable cause and it must
specifically describe the location to be searched and the items to be seized. See United States v,
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See supra notes 2 and 187.
194 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978); Katz v, United States, 389 U.S.
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proclaims to adhere to the warrant standard of reasonableness, having stated
on numerous occasions that warrantless searches "are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment." 195 While this "per se" rule is subject to ex-
ceptions, the Court has emphasized that they must be "specifically established
and well-delineated." 196 Although exceptions may be necessary to deal with
certain difficult situations, the condition that they be "specifically established
and well-delineated" is designed to minimize any departure from the require-
ment of prior judicial .approval of searches under the warrant standard of
reasonableness.' 97 In this way the benefits of requiring a judicial warrant 198
may be maintained except in particular situations where the need for a warrant
would place an unreasonable burden upon law enforcement.' 99
By equating the scope of the warrantless search under the automobile ex-
ception with the scope of a search approved by a neutral and detached
magistrate, 20° the Ross Court has contradicted the rationale behind a warrant
standard of reasonableness. In essence, the Ross decision states that a search
under the automoble exception based on the searching official's inherently
suspect determination of probable cause may without qualification proceed just
as far as a search based on the neutral magistrate's superior determination
of probable cause."' The Ross Court failed to recognize that the scope of a
warrantless search under a "specifically established and well-delineated"
automobile exception should instead be limited to circumstances which can
347, 357 (1967); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, ,J ., dissent-
ing).
195 E.g., United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2172 (quoting from Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (quoting from Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (foot-
notes omitted)). An alternative standard, the "reasonableness" standard, see United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 64 (1950) (holding that to be lawful under the fourth amendment a
search need only be "reasonable" under the circumstances, with no constitutional requirement
of a warrant), has been explicitly rejected by the Court. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 765,
768 (1969); see also Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 758 (1979); United States v. United
States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315 & n.16 (1972). For an excellent analysis of the "war-
rant" approach versus the "reasonableness" approach, and a view that the court actually fluc-
tuates between the two, see Bloom, Warrant Requirement — The Burger Court Approach, 53 U. Cow.
L. REV. 691 (1982).
198 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). See supra notes 5 and 6 and ac-
companying text.
197 See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972); see also
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) (plurality).
' 98 See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
i99 See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759-60 (1979).
2" 102 S. Ct. at 2159, 2172.
"' See id. at 2170-72. The Ross Court stated that since a search of a vehicle made pur-
suant to a valid judicial warrant would include the right to search closed containers found within
the vehicle, a warrantless search of a vehicle should include the same right. Id. at 2170-71. The
Court asserted that the scope of the vehicle searches in both cases should be the same because
the warrantless situation "[o]nly the prior approval of the magistrate is waived." Id. at 2172 (em-
phasis added). Past decisions of the Court, however, underscore what a significant waiver this is,
one that should not be made absent ample justification. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385, 390 (1978) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
September 1983]	 CA SENOTES	 1329
justify the departure from the superior fourth amendment protection provided
by a warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate."'
B. Limiting the Scope As Well As the Initiation of a Search
It is apparent that a warrantless search of some dimension was permissible
in Ross. The police had probable cause to search a vehicle stopped on the public
highway; 203 that is, the automobile exception was applicable.'" Instead of im-
posing precise limits on the scope of the warrantless search which was permissi-
ble, however, the Ross Court instead made that scope as broad as a magistrate
could authorize through a warrant."' The Ross decision thus fails to appreciate
that under a warrant standard of reasonableness the scope, as well as the initia-
tion of warrantless searches, must be limited to those narrowly defined cir-
cumstances which justify dispensing with the neutral magistrate's determina-
tion of probable cause.
The exceptions to the warrant standard of reasonableness's general re-
quirement of search warrants provide for particular situations where it would
unreasonably hinder effective law enforcement if a searching official was re-
quired to obtain prior judicial approval. 206 Consistent with the requirement
that these exceptions be "specifically established and well-delineated," 207 war-
rantless searches are limited to the particular circumstances which justify
dispensing with the warrant requirement."' Under the automobile exception,
therefore, a warrantless search may be initiated only where the situation
presents the requisite justifying circumstances of "inherent mobility" and a
"diminished expectation of privacy. " 209
It is imperative that this limitation be applied to the scope as well as the in-
itiation of a warrantless search under the automobile exception. 21 ° An over-
broad scope can be just as detrimental to the rationale behind a warrant stand-
ard of reasonableness as the unrestrained allowance of a warrantless intrusion
in the first place.'" Both would mean the allowance of searches based only on
the searching official's determination of probable cause" in the absence of
202 See infra notes 203-21 and accompanying text.
202
 See 102 S. Ct. at 2160, 2168 & n.22.
204 Id. at 2159, 2164, 2169.
2" See id. at 2172.
206 See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759-60 (1979); United States v. United
States District Court, 407. U.S. 297, 318 (1972).
20 ' Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
208 See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759-60 (1979).
209 See supra notes 31-66 and accompanying text.
2" See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759-60 (1979); Chime! v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 762, 768 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968).
7" See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17.18 (1968). "This Court has held in the past that a
search which is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its in-
tolerable intensity and scope." Id.
2'2
	 supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
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particular circumstances justifying a departure from the general rule requiring
the prior approval of a neutral magistrate. 2 's To preserve the heightened fourth
amendment protection offered by a neutral magistrate's determination of prob-
able cause, an exception to the warrant requirement must operate within
logical and carefully defined boundaries, both as to the initiation and the scope
of warrantless searches. 2 " A warrantless search should be allowed only when
circumstances which justify the operation of a recognized exception to the war-
rant requirement exist, and should proceed only as far as those circumstances
justify. 215
 This is not necessarily to the full extent which the searching govern-
ment official deems to be proper. 216
The Ross decision ignores the fact that consistent application of a warrant
standard of reasonableness can only be achieved through a dual limitation of
warrantless searches. 217
 Although the circumstances which can justify the in-
itiation of a warrantless search under the automobile exception have been
specifically defined by the Court in prior decisions, 2 " the Court nonetheless
allowed the scope of the warrantless search in Ross to proceed further than
those circumstances could justify. 219 In Ross, the warrantless searches of two
closed containers were upheld under the automobile exception, despite the fact
that neither "inherent mobility" nor any "diminished expectation of privacy"
justified allowing the police to open either container without first providing the
owner of those containers with the additional fourth amendment protection
secured by a search warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate. 22° Such
an expansion of the scope of the warrantless search permissible under the
automobile exception is inconsistent with a general requirement for search
warrants subject only to "specifically established and well-delineated" excep-
tions. 221
213 See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1977); Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 766 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968).
2" See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759-60 (1979); United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. 56, 80 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Thus, the Court has repeatedly asserted
that any exception to the warrant requirement must be "specifically established and well-
delineated." E.g., United States v. Ross, 102 U.S. at 2172; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357 (1967).
2 ' 5 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969). "The scope of [a] search must be
'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible."
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967)
(Fortas, J., concurring)).
216 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 450-51 (1971) (plurality). "[Un-
justified warrantless] searches are held unlawful nonwithstanding facts unquestionably showing
probable cause." Id. (quoting Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925)). In light of this
proposition, the searching government official's determination of probable cause, however ac-
curate it may be in any particular instance, will be insufficient to make a search reasonable, ab-
sent justifying circumstances.
217 See supra notes 210.16 and accompanying text.
218 See supra notes 31-66 and accompanying text.
218
 See 102 S. Ct. at 2172.
220 See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
221 102 S. Ct. at 2172 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (foot-
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C. "Practical Considerations" Versus the Consistent Protection
of Fourth Amendment Rights
The Ross Court attempted to support its expanded definition of the scope
of a warrantless search under the automobile exception by referring to so-called
"practical considerations. "222 In essence, the Court asserted that "practical
considerations," other than the justifying factors heretofore associated with the
automobile exception,'" made it necessary for a searching official to be able,
without the prior approval of a neutral magistrate, to open closed containers
found during the course of a valid warrantless search of a motor vehicle. 224
Despite the Ross Court's contentions, it seems clear that it would not seriously
impede effective law enforcement to require the searching official to obtain a
warrant before opening any closed containers found within a motor vehicle. 226
Even assuming some hindrance to law enforcement due to such a requirement,
however, the Ross decision fails to accurately balance it against the impairment
of fourth amendment rights which is caused by warrantless searches exceeding
the "specifically established and well-delineated" circumstances which justify
the automobile exception. 226
The Ross Court asserted that the search of a closed container is a logical
extension from the search of the vehicle in which the closed container is found,
especially since it is likely that the object of a vehicle search will be concealed,
often in a closed container."' The Court concluded that because of this logical
relationship between a container and the vehicle in which it is located, it would
be impractical to allow one search without a warrant, yet require a warrant for
the other.'" The Court also asserted that to avoid unreasonable results it is
necessary for the searching official to be able to open closed containers during a
warrantless search under the automobile exception.'" The Court stated that if
the object of the search was in a closed container, the police should be allowed
to find it on the spot and avoid having to tear the automobile apart in further
search, a course which would be necessary if police were required to set con-
tainers aside until a warrant was obtained to search them."° Also, the Court
continued, if the containers did not hold any illicit material it is important that
the police discover that fact while the car is being searched since that fact would
indicate that the object of the search could be in some "yet undiscovered por-
tion of the vehicle.""' The Court argued in effect that a warrantless search
notes omitted)).
222 See id. at 2171 n.28.
223 See supra notes 31-66 and accompanying text.
224 See 102 S. Ct. at 2171 n.28.
"' See infra notes 233-44 and accompanying text.
226 See infra notes 245-48 and accompanying text.
227 See 102 S. Ct. at 2170.
226 See id. at 2170, 2171 n.28.
229
	 id. at 2171 n.28.
"° See id.
"' See id.
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without the right to open closed containers could result in greater than nec-
essary intrusions on privacy interests, and force police who came up empty
handed to detain the vehicle until any containers could be opened. 232
These arguments fall short of establishing that the exclusion of closed con-
tainers from the scope of the warrantless search permissible under the
automobile exception would work any unreasonable hardship upon law en-
forcement officials. Whether or not one sees the search of a container as a
logical extension of the search of a car within which that container was located,
the fact remains that the opening of a closed container is a separate additional
search which may be delayed until a warrant is obtained. 233 The broad
generalization that contraband is likely to be concealed within a closed con-
tainer is pure speculation as applied to each individual search, especially in
cases where the searching official's determination of probable cause may in fact
be erroneous due to his lack of objectivity . 234 As to the argument that an on the
spot warrantless opening of closed containers could prevent further un-
necessary intrusions if fruitful, it seems far more likely that a searching official,
upon opening a closed container and discovering contraband, will be even fur-
ther encouraged to perform a top to bottom search of the vehicle in the hope of
finding more evidence of illegality.'" Finally, it is unclear why the Ross Court
indicated that since closed containers may contain no evidence of any illegality,
police would have to detain a vehicle until every closed container could be
opened. 236 It is difficult to see how the immediate opening of closed containers
holding no contraband will aid police in finding illicit materials located in some
"yet undiscovered portion of the vehicle," or otherwise necessarily alter the
immediate search of the vehicle itself. 237 Contrary to the Ross Court's asser-
tions, it seems that a search of the vehicle itself could have been carried out just
as effectively if closed containers were seized and held until a warrant to search
them could be obtained, 238 rather than included in the scope of the warrantless
search allowed under the automobile exception. 259
These "practical considerations" are insignificant when weighed against
the fourth amendment protection which is sacrificed by the expansion of the
232 See id.
2" See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763-65 (1979).
234 See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
235 See 102 S. Ct. at 2179 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
236 See id. at 2171 n.28.
2" See id.
"' Such a warrantless detention based on the searching official's determination of prob-
able cause would be reasonable since the alternative to holding the container is to lose whatever
illicit contents it might have, a severe burden on law enforcement. See United States v. Van
Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252-53 (1970). While exigency justifies the detention of such a con-
tainer, the same cannot be said for its warrantless search. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,
765 n.14 (1979).
239 California v. Robbins, 453 U.S. 420, 423-29 (1981) (plurality) (effectively overruled
by United States v. Ross, 102 U.S. 2157 (1982)).
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scope of the warrantless search permissible under the automobile exception.'"
No circumstance associated with closed containers makes it unreasonable to re-
quire police to obtain a warrant before searching them. 14 ' This is evidenced by
the fact that a warrant is required to search closed containers found in contexts
other than the one faced by the Ross Court."' If a warrant will be required
when a closed container is seized from the trunk of a parked car, 243 then there is
no reason one could not be reasonably required when a closed container is
taken from a vehicle stopped on the highway. 244
 The fact that the police in Ross
had probable cause to search the car as well as the containers found within the
car does not change the fact that the police could have seized the closed con-
tainers and set them aside until a warrant was obtained with little or no difficul-
ty or risk.
The fourth amendment rights sacrificed, however, by not following such a
course in Ross are significant. At stake is the superior fourth amendment
protection provided by the neutral magistrate's determination of probable
cause.'" The magistrate's prior approval cannot be waived every time it sim-
ply removes a burden for law enforcement officials: 246
 Futhermore, if the
general rule requiring judicial warrants is to be preserved, along with the
added protection it provides, then exceptions to it must truly be "specifically
established and well-delineated. ,,247 By turning to newly discovered "practical
considerations" when the recognized justifications 248
 could not produce the
desired result, the Ross Court has failed to sufficiently account for the fourth
amendment values sacrificed by including closed containers in the scope of the
warrantless search permissible under the automobile exception.
Consequently, although the Ross majority proclaimed its adherence to a
view of the fourth amendment which is based on a warrant standard of
reasonableness, 249
 it is apparent that the Court has taken a step away from the
rationale which underlies that standard. By equating the searching official with
the neutral magistrate,"° and by refusing to tie the scope of the warrantless
search permissible under the automobile exception to the delineated justifica-
tions for that exception,'" the Court has departed from the supposed superiori-
"° See infra notes 245-48 and accompanying text.
24 ' See 102 S. Ct. at 2179 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,
763-64 (1979).
242 See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 1-16 (1977).
24' See id.
244 See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality) (effectively overruled by
United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982)); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
242
 See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
244 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948).
247
	 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); see also Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753, 759-60 (1979).
2" See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
249
	 S. Ct. at 2172.
25°
	 supra notes 182-202 and accompanying text.
25' supra notes 203-21 and accompanying text.
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ty of the neutral and detached magistrate in determining probable cause to
search. 252 The "practical considerations" cited by the Court are insufficient to
justify this departure. 253 Such a departure, however, could be avoided by a
revision of the automobile exception which reflected the idea that search war-
rants should be used whenever reasonably practicable.
III. REVISING THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION
In United States v. Ross the Supreme Court used the automobile exception
to expand the acceptable scope of warrantless searches under the fourth
amendment with the necessary result of reducing the use of the pre-search ap-
proval of the neutral magistrate. A serious revision of the automobile exception
is required to achieve a result which is harmonious with a warrant standard of
reasonableness. 254 This revised automobile exception would more consistently
offer heightened fourth amendment protection"' by reflecting the concept that
warrants should be used whenever it is reasonably practicable to do so. This
would entail dropping the notion of the reduced expectation of privacy from the
automobile exception analysis, 256 and allowing warrantless searches under the
automobile exception only when problems related to mobility would un-
reasonably impair law enforcement."'
Because of the advantages of having a neutral magistrate determine
whether there is probable cause to conduct a search, 258 the current view of the
fourth amendment asserts a requirement that warrants be used as a general
rule. 259 Exceptions to this general rule are created, however, to deal with situa-
tions where it would unreasonably burden law enforcement to require a search
warrant. 26° But because each exception to the warrant requirement necessarily
suspends the added protection provided by the neutral magistrate, the opera-
tion of these exceptions is required to be of a limited nature."' It follows that in
order to consistently provide the significant constitutional safeguard of placing
the neutral magistrate between the individual and the searching official, 262 a
warrant should be used whenever it is reasonably practicable to do so. 263
252
	 supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 222-48 and accompanying text.
25' supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
256 See infra notes 267-72 and accompanying text.
2" See infra notes 273.80 and accompanying text.
258
	 supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
259 See 102 S. Ct. at 2172. Warrantless searches "are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment..." Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
26°
	
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759-60 (1979); United States v. United
States District Court; 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972).
261 See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759-60 (1979); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (exceptions must be "specifically established and well-delineated").
262
	 supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
269
	
proposition has been expressed by the Court as whenever it is "reasonably
practicable" for police to secure a judicial warrant prior to making a search, they "must" do so.
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The automobile exception, like any other exception which allows for war-
rantless searches, is based on factors which purport to justify departing from
the general rule requiring a judicial warrant before a search can be rea-
sonable. 264 Currently, however, the justifying factors associated with the
automobile exception are not effectively used to limit the exception's operation
to only those situations where it would not be reasonably practicable to obtain a
warrant. 265
 The result is that some individuals lose the fourth amendment
benefits provided by a judicial warrant, 266
 even though it was reasonably prac-
ticable for the searching official to secure one prior to the search.
To change this situation, the Supreme Court's current approach to justify-
ing warrantless searches under the automobile exception should be revised.
The factor of a "diminished expectation of privacy' '26 ' should be dropped as a
circumstance which can justify warrantless searches under the automobile ex-
ception. Even assuming its general applicability to motor vehicles,'" this factor
has nothing to do with whether it is reasonably practicable to obtain a
warrant.'" The idea of one's expectation of privacy does fit into fourth amend-
ment doctrine. Its proper function, however, is to determine whether police
conduct amounts to a search or a seizure in the first place; in essence, whether
or not the fourth amendment is implicated at a11. 27° It is anomalous to say that
a motor vehicle displays a great enough expectation of privacy to deserve fourth
amendment protection, 27 ' but at the same time, displays a sufficiently reduced
expectation of privacy to justify withholding one of the main protections of the
fourth amendment; the requirement of a judicial warrant before a search may
be conducted. All privacy interests which come within the ambit of the fourth
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. I, 20 (1968); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925).
264
 These factors are currently phrased by the Court as "inherent mobility" and a
"diminished expectation of privacy." United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977). See
supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
265 See United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2178-80 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Card-
well v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 597-99 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
266 See supra notes 188.94 and accompanying text.
267 See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977).
268
 Despite the Court's reasoning, it seems fairly clear that an individual might
justifiably have a high expectation of privacy in association with his car. An intrusion by police
into someone's car can certainly breach sufficient privacy expectations so as to implicate the
fourth amendment. See Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 368 (1964).
269
 The level of privacy displayed in no way affects the inquiry of whether it is
"reasonably practicable" to obtain a warrant. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156
(1925).
"° See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Rakas
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 & n.12 (1978). One's expectation of privacy in an item is also deter-
minative of standing to challenge fourth amendment violations. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448
U.S. 98, 104-06 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-43 (1978).
271
	 v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-62 (1971) (plurality). "The word
`automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disap-
pears." Id. See supra note 268.
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amendment deserve the protection of the judicial warrant whenever it is
reasonably practicable to provide it . 272
The Court should therefore return to a more narrowly applied automobile
exception based solely on the idea of the mobility of motor vehicles articulated
in Carroll v. United States."' The difficulties involved with seizing and securing a
motor vehicle are such that it would often not be reasonably practicable to re-
quire a government official to obtain a warrant before searching such a
vehicle. 274
 The revised automobile exception would require, however, that
regardless of distinctions between the initiation and the scope of warrantless
searches, 275
 no warrantless intrusion should take place unless the mobility fac-
tor made it not reasonably practicable for police to obtain a warrant."'
Clearly, closed containers could not be searched without a warrant under
such a revised definition of the automobile exception. As a general rule, closed
containers are easily seized and secured, regardless of where they are found."'
In other words, it is reasonably practicable to obtain a warrant before search-
ing a closed container."' The fact that the container might be found during the
course of a lawful vehicle search does not change the searching official's ability
to secure the container until a warrant is obtained, and should have no bearing
on the question of whether a warrant should be required. 279
 The protection of
the fourth amendment should not evaporate merely because a "smaller"
search is made during the course of a "larger" search. 28°
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in United States v. Ross, although asserting that the
fourth amendment is governed by a warrant standard of reasonableness, 281
takes a noticeable step away from that standard. The Ross Court equated the
role of the searching official with that of the superior neutral magistrate in
"2
 The warrant standard of reasonableness applies to searches in general and not mere-
ly to sub-categories within the ambit of the fourth amendment. See Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
2" 267 U.S. 132, 153, 156 (1925).
27*
	 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 765 n.14 (1979); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 153, 156 (1925).
" 5
 It is necessary that warrantless searches in both these contexts be limited. See supra
notes 203-21 and accompanying text.
2" See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925).
2" See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763-64, 765 n.14 (1979); United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977).
2" This proposition assumes the nonapplicability of any other recognized exception to
the warrant requirement. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763 n.11 (1979).
2" See supra note 269.
285 The justification for allowing the "larger" search may be totally inapplicable to the
"smaller" search. Cf. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 428 (1981) (plurality) (effectively
overruled by United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
281 See 102 S. Ct. at 2172.
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determining the proper scope of a warrantless search under the automobile ex-
ception. 282
 By doing so, the Ross Court failed to realize the necessity, under a
warrant standard of reasonableness, of limiting the scope as well as the initia-
tion of warrantless searches under the automobile exception to those cir-
cumstances which justify having such an exception."' Finally, the Ross Court's
attempt to justify this expansion of the automobile exception based on "prac-
tical considerations" failed to sufficiently account for the fourth amendment
values sacrificed, and violates the concept of "specifically established and well-
delineated" exceptions to the warrant requirement. 284
To remedy this inconsistency with the warrant standard of rea-
sonableness, the Court should revise the automobile exception to reflect the
idea that a judicial warrant should be used by searching government officials
whenever reasonably practicable."' This would entail dropping the expecta-
tion of privacy factor from the automobile exception analysis. 286
 It would also
mean allowing warrantless searches under this exception only when, because of
problems related to mobility, it would not be reasonably practicable to require
police to obtain a warrant prior to making a search. 2 $ 7
The result of the Ross decision was to allow the warrantless search of
closed containers during the scope of a warrantless search under the auto-
mobile exception. 288 It is hard, however, to discern any special circumstance in
that general situation which would justify allowing such an immediate war-
rantless search of a closed container. Given the supposed preference for search
warrants, it would seem reasonable to require that closed containers be seized
and secured until a warrant can be obtained. The Court, however, reaches the
opposite result, even as it ardently professes that "warrantless searches are per
se unreasonable — subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions." 289 While it is clear that the definitions of "specific"
and "well-delineated" are changing, it is unclear to what extent the exceptions
will become the rule.
JOHN J. AROMANDO
292 See supra notes 188-202 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 203-21 and accompanying text.
"4 See supra notes 222-48 and accompanying text.
"5 See supra notes 254-80 and accompanying text.
266 supra notes 267-72 and accompanying text.
'" See supra notes 273-80 and accompanying text.
269 102 S. Ct. at 2172 (1982).
789 Id.
